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even knowing that you believed such things (and without quite un-
derstanding just what it is that you have unwittingly been believ-
ing). All of this is presented with a ferocity of conviction that leaves 
you unsettled. And at the end of it all, you have no idea how to go 
about correcting the situation. w Manicheanism, it seems, is a her-
esy not limited to Christians. 
III 
Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of these books is 
that they may lend support to the view-a view that many are wont 
to adopt anyway-that history offers little help in understanding 
current constitutional issues. To be sure, good history is not easily 
come by. The historian has the difficult task of writing about the 
past but for the present; he must moderate a conversation between 
generations that may not speak in the same terms or, worse yet, 
may use the same terms but with different meanings. Conversing 
face-to-face with a friend is often hard enough; conversing with gen-
erations long dead is even harder. And when the conversation 
breaks down, as it frequently does in these books, the historian risks 
becoming merely a polemicist. 
But when the historical conversation prospers, it can be tre-
mendously illuminating; the analyses of American religious history 
offered by Mark DeWolfe Howe and Henry May are noteworthy 
examples. We can still learn a good deal from our forebears, but 
only by actually listening to them before we conscript them to serve 
in our current spiritual and political battles. 
A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Melvin I. Urofsky.t 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1988. Pp. xxii, 969. Cloth, 
$24.00; paperback, $12.00. 
Herman Befz2 
The legal realist movement had its origin in the philosophical 
10. Insofar as Rushdoony does offer prescriptions, they are much like those of CLS not 
only in the level of their abstraction but even, sometimes, in their substance. For instance, 
Rushdoony explains that we must "take government back from the state and restore to man 
his responsibility and freedom to be, in every sphere of life, a participating and governing 
power." Perhaps Rushdoony and Roberto Unger should collaborate on their next book. 
I. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
2. Professor of History, University of Maryland. Co-author of THE AMERICA~ Cor;. 
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pragmatism of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century thinkers 
such as Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and Karl Llewellyn, who in their 
famous revolt against formalism rejected logic, abstraction, deduc-
tion, verbal systems, and fixed principles as inadequate for under-
standing the nature of law and legal decisionmaking. According to 
the realist critique, legal analysis should be result oriented, gov-
erned by a logic of consequences, rather than of rigid demonstration 
from antecedents and first principles.J Contemporaneously in the 
field of constitutional history and law, progressive historians and 
political scientists taught that the Constitution was an instrument of 
class rule that reflected socioeconomic interests, rather than a body 
of political principles possessing philosophical coherence and intrin-
sic validity. 4 
The threat to democracy and the rule of law posed by totalitar-
ianism in World War II and the cold war disabused many realist-
minded scholars of these notions and caused traditional constitu-
tionalism, including legal formalism, to appear in a more favorable 
light.s Formal constitutional principles, including in some in-
stances the original intent of the framers, were discovered to have a 
useful purpose in protecting civil rights and liberties, and even to 
express moral and philosophical truths. The result of this reassess-
ment was a modified progressive or liberal outlook that combined, 
without reconciling, realist instrumentalism and intrinsic constitu-
tionalism, respectively, as major and minor themes in constitutional 
and legal history.6 In a further elaboration of the antiformalist im-
pulse, the realist view was radically extended in the 1970s and 1980s 
in works of the new legal history and the Critical Legal Studies 
movement. 7 Yet there were also several counter-currents in consti-
tutional history, including liberal theorists like Ronald Dworkin as 
STITL'TION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (with A. Kelly & W. Harbison) (6th ed. 
1983). 
3. W. Rt:MBLE. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE Jt:DI-
CIAL PROCESS 5-10 (1968); M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOCGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT 
AGAINST FORMALISM 3-15 (1949). 
4. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION Of THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1913); J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1907); Ran-
dall, The Interrelation of Social and Constitutional History, 35 AM. HIST. REV. I ( 1929). 
5. E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); Belz, Changing Conceptions of Constitutionalism in 
the Era of World War II and the Cold War, 59 J. AM. HIST. 640 (1972). 
6. Cf J. HURST. LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (5th ed. 1976); C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CoNSTI-
TUTIO!'IAL DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1954). 
7. The new legal history is illustrated in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW (1973) and M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA!\/ LAW, 1780-1860 
( 1977). For a discussion of critical legal studies logic. see Yack, Toward a Free Marketplace 
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well as the works of Straussians and other political scientists writing 
in the tradition of political philosophy and intrinsic consti-
tutionalism.s 
In this historiographical context Professor Melvin I. Urofsky's 
A March of Liberty assumes significance as an attempt to employ 
the perspective of legal realism as an analytical framework for writ-
ing a history of the American Constitution. Taking as his point of 
departure the "veritable revolution" in constitutional and legal his-
tory that has occurred in recent years, Professor Urofsky states his 
intention "to blend the so-called 'new legal history' with the usual 
emphasis on great cases." The new legal history refers generally to 
the study of judicial decisions that has been expanded "to include 
the economic, social, political as well as legal circumstances sur-
rounding those controversies." More precisely, the conception of 
legal history that informs A March of Liberty holds that "law mir-
rors social demands and needs; it has no life of its own, but always 
interacts with society and is subject to shifts in power."9 
Urofsky also proposes to use the "great cases" approach to 
constitutional history. It is not clear what he intends by this term, 
but it appears to mean that some judicial decisions affect the course 
of history in momentous ways. It may also imply that great cases 
do not merely reflect social forces. If social forces were the decisive 
agent in history, would we not celebrate them rather than the court 
decisions that are merely the conduit through which they are ex-
pressed? The "great cases" approach may imply, then, that some 
judicial decisions not only possess critical importance, but also that 
they rest upon sound thinking and legal reasoning and evince a cor-
rect interpretation of the Constitution or a statute. 
That this is the operative meaning of the "great cases" method-
ology is suggested by the many momentous, soundly reasoned, and 
presumably constitutionally correct decisions described in A March 
of Liberty. These decisions, however, are preponderantly those il-
lustrating twentieth-century liberalism. This fact leads us to con-
sider the character of Urofsky's work as substantive historical 
interpretation. 
of Social Institutions: Roberto Ungers ''Super-Liberal"" Theory of Emancipation (Book Re-
view) 101 HARV. L. REV. 1961 (1988). 
8. See Lerner, The Constitution of the Thinking Revolutionary, in BEYOND CoNFED-
ERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (R. 
Beeman, S. Botein, and E. Carter, II eds. 1987); Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Consti-
tution, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33. The author of this Book Review would 
include his own account of American constitutional history in this category of writing. See 
A. KELLY, W. HARBISON & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN COI'.STITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 1983). 
9. The quotation is from L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 10. 
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In the values it asserts and the conclusions it reaches, Urof-
sky's constitutional history is a thoroughly liberal book. It may not 
be too much to say that it reflects an unabashed liberal bias. As an 
introductory example, one notes the author's cloying conceit of tell-
ing his story frequently through the eyes of "civil libertarians," as 
though there existed in society a readily identifiable group whose 
function it is to monitor the state of our liberties and whose values 
and point of view can be relied on as a valid standard of historical 
and political judgment. A further expression of liberal bias is the 
author's practice of dismissing conservative constitutional argu-
ments and decisions as erroneous and motivated by selfish group 
and class interests, while treating liberal decisions as motivated by 
considerations of public interest and a desire to uphold the Consti-
tutiOn. Indeed, Urofsky evinces a kind of intellectual antinomian-
ism that leads him to disregard the canons of critical scholarship 
and apply a double standard of judgment in analyzing the political 
actors and constitutional decisionmakers who appear in his 
narrative. 
I 
Let us evaluate A March of Liberty by considering its treatment 
of four fundamental principles of American constitutionalism: fed-
eralism, the separation of powers, individual and community liberty 
under republican self-government, and the rule of law as embodied 
in a written constitution. We begin with federalism, the geopolitical 
organizing principle of the American polity. 
Urofsky reflects the assumption, characteristic oflate twenti-
eth-century liberalism, that centralized government and administra-
tion are inherently superior to local authority and represent the 
reasonable and correct position in conflicts between center and pe-
riphery. Although the states' rights tradition is recognized in Urof-
sky's account, that recognition is minimal. For example, Urofsky 
fails to discuss the British Empire as a system of divided sovereignty 
and American theories of federalism in the pre-revolutionary pe-
riod. He points out that divided sovereignty existed under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, with the sovereignty of the states standing 
higher than that of the Confederation. This imbalance was rectified 
by the Constitution, however, which "clearly put the sovereignty of 
the nation over that of the states, although it would take a civil war 
to finally confirm this view." To support this contention Urofsky 
cites the preamble-"We the people of the United States ... do 
ordain and establish"-and the supremacy clause. "We the people" 
can be understood as referring to the people of the several states, 
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however, a point later acknowledged when the author concedes that 
Senator Hayne may have been "technically correct" in claiming 
that the states through the ratification process made the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the supremacy clause does not refer to the sov-
ereignty of the nation, but makes the Constitution, laws made in 
pursuance of it, and treaties, the supreme law of the land. To cite 
this as proof of the limited role of the states begs the question of the 
respective constitutional powers of the states and the national gov-
ernment. Finally, if the nature of the Union had been as clear as 
Urofsky says it was, it is doubtful that a civil war would have been 
required to resolve the issue. 
Urofsky's account of federalism in the constitutional conven-
tion is slight, superficial, and lacking in analytical rigor. Nor does 
he treat the subject more searchingly in the period down to the Civil 
War. Having concluded that the Constitution clearly resolved the 
question of the nature of the Union, he is unable to appreciate the 
complexity and importance of federal-state relations in the eyes of 
participants. He fails to understand that the historical possibility 
existed of a decentralized, plural nation, ignoring the fact that "the 
times"-a legitimating authority in Urofsky's pragmatic instrumen-
talism-seemed to demand such an approach to nationhood and 
that the states' rights doctrine was appealed to in all sections of the 
country. Omitting any discussion of democratic dual federalism, 
Urofsky reduces the controversy over the federal system to a split 
between southerners asserting states' rights and Whigs and Jack-
sonians who he says shared essentially the same "vision of the 
Union." In this view Chief Justice Taney, despite his sympathy for 
states' rights, is "as much a nationalist as Marshall"-a curious 
judgment inasmuch as Taney is later described as favoring se-
cession. 
During the Civil War the old debate over the division of sover-
eignty gave way to "a newer and more vital concern over the role of 
the central government as the preserver of national unity and the 
protector of individual liberties." Although wartime centralization 
was temporary, it foreshadowed the demise of federalism in the 
twentieth century, when in the ideology of modern liberalism power 
and liberty were united, and the exercise of government power was 
seen as an expansion of individual or group liberty. Within this 
framework Urofsky gives short shrift to federalism as reciprocally 
limiting divided sovereignty in the American state system. New 
Deal centralization, for example, is treated only incidentally, as an 
aspect of the Court-packing fight. Insofar as it is acknowledged to 
have occurred, centralization under Roosevelt is described as a mat-
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ter of the Supreme Court after 1937 returning to the broad view of 
the commerce power intended by the framers, and as a function of 
the nationalization of the economy which was in process long before 
the Depression. About recent developments in federalism Urofsky 
has little to say, except to note that some state courts have afforded 
more protection to civil liberties than the Supreme Court. His dis-
regard of federalism is evidenced most spectacularly by his failure 
to mention National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), the Burger 
Court's attempt to revive tenth amendment federalism, and Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985), reversing 
Usery and holding that there are no constitutional limits imposed on 
the commerce power of the federal government by the tenth 
amendment. w 
II 
If contemporary liberalism rejects the divided sovereignty of 
federalism, it finds the separation of powers more useful to its ends. 
A March of Liberty traces the formation of institutional arrange-
ments based on the separation principle, giving special attention to 
the growth of the imperial presidency. While the inquiry into this 
subject does not entirely ignore liberal presidents, conservatives are 
seen as primarily responsible for executive power excesses. 
Andrew Johnson was the preeminent nineteenth-century pre-
cursor of the imperial presidency. According to Urofsky, Johnson 
sought to prevent any meaningful reconstruction, forced Congress 
to pursue the policy toward him that it did, and "ensured another 
century of racial animosity." Claiming "powers that would later be 
described as imperial in nature," Johnson asserted the right to de-
cide unilaterally which laws were constitutional, and which he 
would enforce. Rarely has Andrew Johnson been so severely 
judged. Urofsky states that Johnson "played outside the rules," 
"moved completely outside the regular political process, and ... 
brought the constitutional system as near to destruction as had the 
war itself." Contrary to prevailing scholarly opinion, Urofsky con-
cludes that the attempt to convict Johnson in the impeachment 
trial, not his acquittal, upheld the separation of powers. 
Among twentieth-century chief executives, the actions of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt would appear relevant to understanding the 
origins of the imperial presidency, and to some extent Urofsky 
seems to agree. He observes that New Deal planners ignored tradi-
10. See Kincaid and Schechter, The State of American Federalism-1985, Pusuus 
Summer, 1986 at I. 
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tiona! constitutional limitations, that the administration was indif-
ferent to basic constitutional doctrine, that Roosevelt had a 
politician's pragmatic view of the Constitution, and that his emer-
gency acts in 1933 rested on a "flimsy constitutional basis." Yet 
Roosevelt "did not invent the 'imperial presidency.' " His signifi-
cance was to play "a key role in developing the modern idea of 
strong executive leadership." 
If Urofsky at least raises the question of FDR and swollen 
presidential prerogatives, his liberal bias is evident in his general 
treatment of the New Deal President. He ignores the issue, dealt 
with in recent scholarship, of whether Roosevelt's Court-packing 
plan, his executive reorganization proposal, his use of government 
employees and relief recipients for partisan purposes, and his at-
tempted purge of the Democratic party together constituted a 
threat to the separation of powers. The Court reform bill is the only 
one of these actions that Urofsky discusses, and of it he says only 
that FDR's "famed political sagacity" for once deserted him. What 
about Roosevelt's constitutional judgment? Are we to conclude 
that it was sound on this matter? Urofsky agrees that a constitu-
tional crisis occurred in the mid-1930s, but in his opinion Roosevelt 
had nothing to do with it. The crisis was caused by the failure of 
conservative Supreme Court Justices to rethink the Constitution. 
President Roosevelt was simply an earnest experimenter, trying to 
keep up with "the temper of the times," who created "the most 
innovative government in American history." This evaluation 
hardly accords Roosevelt the constitutional significance that is de-
servedly his, even in a critical view that sees him as attempting to 
create a centralized bureaucratic state that would render party poli-
tics superfluous.l 1 On the evidence that Urofsky himself presents, it 
is reasonable to think that if FDR and his followers were as casual 
about the Constitution as they appear in this account, the Supreme 
Court may very well have been right to strike down many New 
Deal measures. 
Presidential power may have expanded enormously from 
Roosevelt to Lyndon B. Johnson, but it was Richard M. Nixon who 
in Urofsky's view threatened to destroy the constitutional balance 
between the executive and legislative branches. Whereas his prede-
cessors tested the limits of presidential authority, Nixon claimed 
"unlimited" and "absolute authority." Even so, his claims were 
seen as within the parameters of the constitutional process, Urofsky 
II. See Milkis, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transcendence of Partisan Politics, 100 
Pol. SCI. Q. 479 (1985); THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY: CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 
(R. Eden ed .. 1989). 
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says, until Watergate occurred and the forces of morality and recti-
tude in Congress and the press revealed Nixon for the tyrant he 
was-or aspired to be. In the end, Watergate pitted good men 
against bad: "Nixon, Mitchell, and Kleindienst debased their of-
fices; Sam Ervin, Archibald Cox, and Elliot Richardson fulfilled the 
trust placed in them." 
In a work prefaced by the express intention to consider the 
political and social circumstances surrounding the legal controver-
sies it recounts, this is a peculiarly moralistic, ad hominem judg-
ment. Urofsky's account of Nixon and Watergate occurs in a 
political vacuum. There is no reference to the violence and social 
upheaval that erupted on the left and dominated American politics 
from 1964 to 1969; no mention of the liberal and radical hatred of 
Nixon, cultivated for twenty years, that greeted his inauguration; no 
discussion even of Nixon's political outlook and his own hostility 
toward the bureaucracy and the press. The lesson of Watergate is 
simple, according to Urofsky: Nixon was a corrupt man who over-
reached himself. 
In an unconvincing attempt at impartiality, Urofsky says 
Nixon did not create the imperial presidency and cannot be blamed 
for the vast growth of executive power. The Constitution, he ex-
plains, gives the president a leading role in foreign affairs, which has 
been extended equally in dom~stic politics by political events and 
modern communications. Urofsky goes on to justify the plebisci-
tary presidency, being careful to distinguish it from Nixon's exercise 
of power. Liberal scholars, he points out, had been developing the 
theory of the plebiscitary presidency-that is, the idea that the gov-
ernment of the United States resides in the presidency-long before 
some analysts suggested it applied to the Nixon White House. Lib-
erals reasoned that a strong executive may be necessary for modern 
democratic societies, because only the president can speak for all 
the people and translate the national will into action. But liberals 
had in mind a Franklin Roosevelt or a John Kennedy, not a Rich-
ard Nixon, for their assumptions "relied on a noble, or at least an 
honest, President." U rofsky advises us that the "plebiscitary presi-
dency may well be necessary in a modern society," with the clear 
inference that this is constitutionally permissible only if liberals are 
elected to fill the office! Meanwhile, since Nixon's resignation, new 
accommodations and continuous adjustments between the executive 
and Congress have been made under the separation of powers, 
which remains a useful instrument for checking conservative 
presidents. 
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III 
Liberty under republican government is a third concept we 
may employ in assessing Urofsky's book. What is the nature of the 
liberty that is on the march in American constitutional history and 
whither is it tending? 
We note first that the threat to American liberty traditionally 
viewed as the reason for creating republican governments in the rev-
olutionary era is not recognized as an objective reality. Americans 
rebelled not against British tyranny, Urofsky argues, but against the 
perception of tyranny. The nation was founded not out of a rational 
decision to create a constitution guaranteeing liberty, but rather out 
of fears and anxieties conditioned by republican ideology. The im-
plication is that Americans did not understand the nature of British 
rule, and by extension the nature of liberty. The conditional or 
equivocal nature of the American appeal to liberty is seen in the 
Declaration of Independence. Putting aside Jefferson's magnificent 
generalizations and examining the Declaration "on its own terms," 
Urofsky describes it as "a propaganda document" designed to jus-
tify unlawful action. In fact, however, if we consider the Declara-
tion on its own terms we see that it asserts self-evident natural-
rights principles of equality and consent as the basis of American 
government. To be sure, Urofsky recognizes that the Declaration 
has had more than propagandistic value in our history. He says it 
"enshrined the compact theory as the heart of the American philos-
ophy of government." He does not mean to say, however, that the 
Declaration possesses a rational meaning that endures and is still 
valid. Rather, it expressed "sentiments," became an "article of 
faith," and was significant for the broad assertions of immutable 
principle that later generations read into it. The Declaration, in 
Urofsky's view, is a palimpsest on which Americans write their 
changing notions of liberty. 
Urofsky takes the position that liberty has no fixed meaning. 
"Measuring liberty is a difficult, if not impossible task," he writes, 
"because ... the criteria are always changing." He illustrates by 
pointing out that since the 1930s, "a veritable revolution" in liberty 
has occurred as ideas of racial and gender equality, personal auton-
omy, civil liberties, and criminal law procedures have been radically 
transformed. A possible implication of this statement is that a more 
genuine liberty exists now than before. Certainly U rofsky's 
favorable discussion of Supreme Court decisions that have helped 
bring about the radical transformation to which he refers suggests 
that the liberties in question are not to be considered of merely tem-
porary validity. Yet if the criteria of liberty are always changing, no 
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such judgment of permanent or universal validity is possible. 
Under the relativistic assumptions on which Urofsky's work is 
based, the conclusion follows that liberty must be defined positivisti-
cally as whatever the dominant political majority, acting through 
prescribed forms and procedures, decides it will be. 
Urofsky's treatment of at least two major issues, however, ap-
pears to contradict the relativistic and positivistic premises of his 
realist-instrumentalist perspective. The first issue is whether slavery 
was compatible or could properly coexist with liberty under the 
Constitution. Although at one point he seems to imply that it 
could, stating that slavery was protected by "a sacred compromise," 
on balance he appears to hold otherwise. He emphasizes the steps 
taken by the founders to contain slavery, and says that in the ante-
bellum period the United States was not bound by common alle-
giance to particular ideals and loyalty to a single government. This 
means there were separate systems of liberty in North and South, 
only one of which could be genuinely constitutional. The abolition 
of slavery and the adoption of the Reconstruction amendments ap-
peared to resolve this problem by creating a single system of liberty 
and civil rights. In the form of racial segregation and discrimina-
tion, however, the problem recurred and continued for a century 
after formal emancipation. Liberty for whites in the South, and in 
the nation as a whole, was arguably not legitimate constitutional 
liberty so long as blacks were denied civil rights and real freedom. 
Urofsky describes the resolution of the American dilemma in 
Supreme Court decisions from Brown to Bakke, Weber, and the 
most recent affirmative action holdings. This narrative of the strug-
gle for civil rights reflects an obvious double standard of judgment. 
U rofsky tells the story of black legal protest and civil rights march-
ers joyously singing that they would overcome the legacy of slavery 
and discrimination. But he makes no mention whatsoever of black 
violence and rioting, the widespread destruction of property in 
scores of cities, and the decline of the civil rights movement into 
black power militance. If these actions were an expression of polit-
ical liberty-as some have argued and as might be inferred under 
Urofsky's always changing criteria for measuring liberty-they de-
serve analysis. On the other hand, if black rioting was criminal dis-
order it ought also to be discussed. Whichever it was, a "realist" 
should consider whether it played a critical role in the origins of 
affirmative action. 
Urofsky notes that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 imposed penal-
ties for interstate travel and transportation for the purpose of civil 
disorder. He provides no explanation, however, of why such legis-
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lation was deemed necessary.12 President Nixon's election is de-
scribed as expressing a white backlash against blacks for pushing 
too hard in the quest for equality. A less biased account would rec-
ognize that the conservative reaction of the late 1960s, insofar as it 
was about race, was principally directed at the violence and social 
disorder in the black community. Ever the good liberal, however, 
Urofsky condemns the white South for its violent opposition to 
blacks' civil rights advances. He asserts that a "breakdown of law-
ful authority" occurred in the South after the Brown decision, that 
the White Citizens' Councils were "pledged to total war in defense 
of segregation," and that the nation accepted the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 because it was "exhausted by senseless bloodshed." These 
statements are of dubious accuracy. Urofsky's account of the 
1960s-"a nation in turmoil" -is seriously incomplete and reflects 
confusion about the nature of liberty and the criteria for evaluating 
it. 
The nature and significance of property rights and economic 
enterprise under republican government form a second issue for 
considering how liberty should be measured. In describing state 
common-law developments in the nineteenth century Urofsky treats 
entrepreneurial pursuits as a legitimate aspect of civil liberty. Prop-
erty rights were part of the cultural pattern of liberal individualism 
that was the basis of social progress. Although noting that laboring 
men were "not totally wrong" in believing they bore a dispropor-
tionate burden of the costs of economic development, Urofsky 
states that the people in general favored business growth. The legal 
changes it necessitated, he writes with apparent approval, were "a 
law made for the times." 
The problem is that not all legal developments are "made for 
the times," in the sense of being good for the community and consti-
tutionally legitimate, even though they presumably are "made for 
the times" in a nonpejorative sense. Laissez-faire constitutionalism, 
the cluster of doctrinal innovations by which the courts promoted 
national economic expansion in the late nineteenth century, illus-
trates the point. Urofsky disapproves of substantive due process, 
the most famous of the doctrinal innovations, because it was based 
on "formalism." It "emphasized the letter of the law and ignored 
the realities of economy and society." He recognizes, however, that 
the judicial activism of the Warren Court, of which he approves, is 
12. Radical and new left violence is similarly ignored. Urofsky notes, for example. that 
opposition to the Vietnam War triggered a reaction among blue collar workers and affluent 
business and professional people, but says the reaction was directed at the "new and strik-
ingly different life-styles" of the young protesters. 
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cut from the same jurisprudential cloth as conservative laissez-faire 
activism insofar as it creates rights far beyond what the limited ref-
erences of the written Constitution would seem to permit. Urofsky 
therefore suggests that the problem with substantive due process 
was not the theory itself, but its application. The Supreme Court 
"selected the wrong values for judicial protection." He seeks to but-
tress this subjective judgment by arguing further that the difference 
between nineteenth-century conservative activism and twentieth-
century liberal activism is that the latter has provoked nothing like 
the degree of political criticism that was directed against the former. 
Many would dispute this assertion, however, seeing opposition to 
liberal judicial activism as a major source of the conservative resur-
gence of the past two decades. 
Faithfully reflecting contemporary liberalism, Urofsky distin-
guishes liberal and conservative activism by employing the double 
standard of judicial review associated with footnote four in Carolene 
Products. Economic regulation need only meet the rationality test, 
while measures affecting civil rights and liberties are subject to strict 
scrutiny and bear a presumption of unconstitutionality. Urofsky as-
serts this double standard as a self-evident truth. Intellectual anti-
nomianism apparently releases him from the obligation to explain 
or justify it, except to attribute it to Justice Brandeis. This is evi-
dently considered sufficient authority to establish its transcendent 
validity, making it not merely a law for the times, but for all time. 
IV 
The nature of the Constitution and the rule of law provide still 
another perspective for evaluating U rofsky's survey of constitu-
tional history. In his view, the basic principles of English and 
American constitutionalism are threefold: (1) the existence of a 
fundamental law; (2) the right of the people, through representa-
tives, to participate as equal partners in government; and (3) admin-
istration of the law and justice through courts. Praising the English 
common-law as the best legal system because of its judicially super-
vised flexibility and resilience in meeting new social and economic 
conditions, Urofsky views the American Constitution as a common 
law system possessing similar attributes. The really vital element in 
our constitutionalism, therefore, according to Urofsky, is judicial 
lawmaking. Indeed, the paramount theme of A March of Liberty is 
the wisdom and necessity of government by judiciary. 
So far from being fixed and permanent, as the founding fathers 
conceived of it, the Constitution in Urofsky's account was meant to 
be changed, and not mainly by formal amendment. Because "a de-
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veloping society is constantly reexamining and redefining its val-
ues," he writes, "[f]or the Constitution to remain a viable organic 
law, it too must grow; any other policy, such as a rigid reliance on 
original intent, would lead to what some scholars have termed a 
'clause-bound literalism' that would make the Constitution a strait 
jacket rather than a loose-fitting 'suit of clothes' with room for 
growth and change." Urofsky's sartorial metaphor suggests noth-
ing of the permanence and durability of the architectural language 
used to describe the Constitution in the founding and early national 
period, nor any of the sense of natural development implied in the 
organic metaphors favored by late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century reformers. Urofsky's metaphor suggests that the applica-
tion of constitutional doctrines, like the choice of designer apparel, 
is entirely relative and dependent upon personal taste. It is an apt 
expression of contemporary liberalism. 
Discretionary though the choice of styles in constitutional 
clothing may be, however, Urofsky paradoxically regards it as es-
sential that this function be exercised by the Supreme Court. The 
principal line of continuity that he discerns in American constitu-
tional history is judicial government based on the supremacy of the 
courts in constitutional interpretation. Only the clear location of 
national power in federal courts, for example, averted the legal 
chaos of the Articles of Confederation. More important than the 
exercise of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison was the question: 
who decides who decides? Urofsky says John Marshall assumed 
this power for the Supreme Court, affirming it as "the supreme arbi-
ter of constitutional issues." For the states to enter the field of con-
stitutional dispute and settlement was to invite "anarchy." For 
presidents to ignore the Supreme Court and hold that each branch 
of government could construe the Constitution, as Andrew Jackson 
allegedly did, was a similar prescription for "constitutional 
anarchy." 
According to Urofsky, judicial supremacy has always been 
necessary under a written constitution, because "some agency had 
to serve as the ultimate arbiter of what that Constitution meant." It 
is all the more necessary in the modern world, which is "full of 
challenges never imagined by the Framers." "While democracy 
must not rely on 'a bevy of Platonic guardians,' " Urofsky writes, 
"there is much to be said for a society that refers its most difficult 
problems to courts and then agrees to live under the ensuing rule of 
law." Again, however, Urofsky's liberal antinomianism frees him 
from the intellectual burden of explaining why the courts should 
decide our most pressing problems, along with the wide range of 
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essentially political issues that are typically raised in constitutional 
litigation. In the name of all that is progressive, the ghost of 
Charles Grove Haines must surely be appalled to see liberals like 
Urofsky elevate government by judiciary to the level of paramount 
constitutional principle.IJ 
The Supreme Court's critical governing role focuses attention 
all the more sharply on the question of the nature of judicial deci-
sionmaking. What is really going on when courts resolve constitu-
tional disputes? In chapters on law and economic development in 
the nineteenth century and constitutional law in the Marshall era, 
Urofsky offers an instrumentalist analysis of case law. He states 
that the idea of law as a body of immutable and objective principles 
and rules was found to be illusory. Courts are described as poli-
cymaking institutions deciding cases according to the judges' per-
sonal views of the issues at stake, the interests of the parties to the 
litigation, and "the felt necessities of the time." In the late nine-
teenth century, says Urofsky, courts stressed the letter of the law 
and ignored social realities. It would appear, however, that the lais-
sez-faire and substantive due process decisions that illustrate for-
malism could also be seen as instrumentalist, because they went far 
beyond the letter of the Constitution, promoted specific economic 
and social interests, and had policy implications for creating a na-
tional economic market. The point of calling these decisions for-
malist appears to be to criticize the Supreme Court for not 
responding to social conditions in the "right" way. 
Urofsky's realist-instrumentalist analysis appears to be inappli-
cable, however, to liberal jurisprudence in the post-1937 period. 
Liberal Justices appointed by Roosevelt, he states, were committed 
to preserving the integrity and independence of the Supreme Court. 
It is inaccurate to call them politicians pragmatically tailoring their 
decisions to meet the exigencies of the moment.• 4 The Warren 
Court, we are told, sought to uphold equality and social justice by 
protecting the civil liberties of all Americans. Its apportionment 
decisions expanded and protected individual rights and equality 
before the law. Its criminal procedure rulings asked only that the 
government take constitutional rights seriously. Nowhere is there 
the slightest suggestion that the ideological preferences of the Jus-
tices, the political interests of the Democratic party, or the eco-
nomic advantage of liberal interest groups may have influenced 
13. C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICA!' GOVERNMENT 
AND POLITICS (1944). 
14. Urofsky notes that New Deal Justices were fully sympathetic to labor's goals. La-
bor, however, is described as seeking to exercise its constitutional liberties by organizing and 
bargaining collectively. 
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liberal Supreme Court decisions. 1s 
If the historical record presents a variety of models of judicial 
decisionmaking, how should Supreme Court Justices decide consti-
tutional disputes? Urofsky says we must require, as standards in 
the exercise of judicial power, "balance, sensitivity to the needs of 
society, respect for the prerogatives of other parts of the govern-
ment, and a keen awareness of how the results will affect society as 
well as individual men and women." Conspicuously missing from 
this exhortation to good judicial behavior is a requirement of fidelity 
to law. Perhaps adherence to the text of the Constitution is to be 
dispensed with on the ground, as Urofsky advises, that it runs the 
risk of "clause-bound literalism," and because "[t]he old notion of 
law as a fixed 'brooding omnipresence' has, we hope, been discarded 
forever." Fortunately, he avers, "Holmes's great aphorism, that the 
life of the law has not been logic but experience, is now universally 
accepted." 
In view of Urofsky's profession of realist-instrumentalist meth-
odology, it is curious that so much of his book is given to explicat-
ing the logic of Supreme Court opinions. Why does he spend so 
much time on formal constitutional exegesis, if it is unrelated to the 
outcome of the controversies he seeks to explain? Can this concern 
with the logic of constitutional reasoning be taken as evidence that 
formalism is not, after all, to be dismissed as irrelevant, but may on 
the contrary be essential to the judicial process and constitutional-
ism? And what are we to make of Urofsky's concluding admoni-
tion, that judges must not erect their prejudices into legal principles; 
rather, they must be "guided by the light of reason." Is this an 
appeal to the rational application of legal principles, as one might 
suppose? 
In its focus on and favorable evaluation of judicial supremacy, 
A March of Liberty reflects the jurisprudential sensibility of contem-
porary liberalism. Its assertion of realist-instrumentalist theory, 
however, inconsistently applied and combined with a de facto exer-
cise in doctrinal formalism, suggests a schizoid liberalism. Urof-
sky's realistic interpretation of nineteenth and early twentieth-
century judicial decisionmaking, juxtaposed to his naive, uncritical, 
and apolitical analysis of modern liberal jurisprudence, suggests, 
moreover, that his work is influenced by a type of intellectual anti-
nomianism. Elevated to the level of historical theory, this view 
15. For a contrasting view, see Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, 
in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 179 (A. King ed. 1978); Shapiro, The Constitu-
tion and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITl1TION OF THE UNITED STATES 74-98 
(M. Harmon ed. 1978). 
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holds that those who profess liberal values are able to transcend the 
political forces and social conditions which otherwise affect the ac-
tions of men and women and shape the course of history. Profess-
ing realism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism while practicing to a 
considerable degree a doctrinaire formalism, Urofsky's constitu-
tional history illustrates the tensions and contradictions in late 
twentieth-century liberal scholarship. 
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Daniel A. Farber 2 
If this journal gave titles to book reviews, I would have bor-
rowed one from a famous article by Calabresi called Another View 
of the Cathedral. Calabresi was referring to the Monet paintings 
showing the radically different but always entrancing appearance of 
a cathedral at different times. In his most recent book, Professor 
William Nelson offers us a novel view of the Great Cathedral of 
American Constitutional Law, the fourteenth amendment. 
Like Monet, Professor Nelson sometimes paints with broad 
daubs that may obscure details of the cathedral in the interest of the 
larger picture. He rarely troubles to distinguish between the vari-
ous portions of the fourteenth amendment, an omission that some-
times makes for confusion. Yet, like Monet's, Nelson's painting 
reflects long study of the subject. Unlike prior researchers, he has 
gone beyond the pages of the Congressional Globe to engage in ex-
tensive archival research. 
No one perspective can display the entire cathedral. From the 
novel vantage point chosen by Nelson, some of its familiar parts 
drop out of sight. Histories of the fourteenth amendment normally 
focus on its place in Reconstruction. The amendment was inti-
mately linked with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which in turn grew 
out of the thirteenth amendment. Customarily, historians devote 
considerable attention to the debates on those measures in seeking 
to understand the fourteenth amendment. Nelson, having sought 
higher ground in the hills above the cathedral, devotes virtually no 
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